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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION VIS-
A-VIS NATIONAL SECURITY: 
THE NEED TO STRIKE THE BAL-
ANCE IN EASTERN AFRICA 
With increasing security threats, Eastern 
African nations are at the crossroads of balanc-
ing national security and freedom of expression. 
The volatile geopolitics of the region may gener-
ally justify a broader margin of appreciation in 
favor of national security. However, if that dis-
cretion is abused, it becomes counterproductive 
as a systemic suppression of freedoms may be a 
national security threat in itself, especially in a 
region characterized by porous borders, ethnic 
and religious diversity, and secessionist tenden-
cies and realities. 
In December 2014, the Kenyan Parlia-
ment passed the Security Laws (Amendment) 
Bill, which amends about twenty-one existing 
parliamentary acts. Human rights activists and 
Kenyan opposition consider the bill "draconian:' 
It introduces a new section to the National Intel-
ligence Services Act to grant the Director-Gen-
eral the power to authorize mass surveillance of 
communications for national security purposes. 
The bill also adds a section to the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act to criminalize the publication of 
photographs of victims of terrorist attacks with-
out the consent of the National Police Service 
and the victim. 
The Kenyan Government considers the bill 
a response to recurring terrorist attacks from Al-
Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group based in 
neighboring Somalia. Since 2010, the group has 
taken responsibility for multiple attacks, includ-
ing bombings in Kampla, Uganda; the attack on 
Westgate mall in 2013, and a 2014 attack that 
killed 28 in Kenya. 
In 2009, Ethiopia passed an anti-terrorism 
law based on similar justifications. According to 
United Nations experts and other rights groups, 
the Ethiopian Government is using the An-
ti-Terrorism Proclamation to suppress various 
rights, including freedom of expression, by 
prosecuting "journalists, bloggers, and oppo-
sition politicians:' Meanwhile, some claim that 
Ethiopia experienced fewer attacks after the new 
law took effect, and have been advising Kenya to 
learn from Ethiopia. The United Kingdom has 
insisted that Kenya pass a tight anti-terrorism 
law since 2011. 
The debate over the Kenyan bill highlights 
the fundamental challenge of balancing free-
doms and national security in the region. Un-
stable geopolitical situation may provide nations 
with a broader margin of discretion in favoring 
their security. However, the discretion is not 
unlimited under international human rights law. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), to which all eastern African 
nations except South Sudan are parties, provides 
for the right to freedom of expression under 
Article 19, but recognizes national security as a 
legitimate justification to restrict the freedom. 
Ensuring national security is a fundamental 
precondition to safeguard human rights includ-
ing freedom of expression. National security 
may be invoked in response to situations that 
may threaten the existence of a nation, its ter-
ritorial integrity, or its political independence. 
However, restrictions based on security interests 
must have a genuine purpose and demonstrable 
effect of protecting national security. It may not 
be invoked to impose arbitrary restrictions or 
perpetuate systematic violation of human rights. 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
General Comment 34 also calls for strict adher-
ence to the tests of necessity and proportionality. 
Nations have a general discretion to define 
what constitutes a national security threat. In 
east Africa, territorial integrity may be a key 
interest for several reasons. Firstly, the region 
is arguably one of world's most volatile. The 
region witnessed two recent successful seces-
sionist movements leading to the creation of 
Eritrea and South Sudan. Neither movement 
delivered the freedoms they promised. Rather, 
Eritrea is considered by some to be state sponsor 
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of terrorism, and civil war is still waging South 
Sudan. Secondly, in the region is also war-torn 
Somalia, which has been referred to as a "failed 
State;' where groups such as Al-Shabaab and Al 
Ittihad al Islamiya are based. Additionally, the 
fact that nations in region share porous borders 
with similar ethnic demographics, languages, or 
religion may enhance adjacent countries' real or 
perceived susceptibility to security concerns. 
Counterterrorism may unavoidably be 
incompatible with human rights as fighting ter-
rorism "necessarily involves the state taking on 
new powers of surveillance and enforcement:' 
However, states need to act in good faith taking 
into account the exigencies of the situation as re-
quired by the Siracusa and Johannesburg Princi-
ples on limiting freedoms. States need to recog-
nize that systematic violations of human rights 
by themselves may ultimately lead to national 
security threats. It is important to note that the 
secessionist movements that created Eritrea and 
South Sudan were responses to grave human 
rights situations in the respective nations. 
It may be difficult to tailor the actual breadth 
of security laws in advance of the situations they 
purport to govern. Thus, the guiding principle 
should be that laws too suppressive of freedom 
of expression are national security threats in 
themselves. 
BEYOND THE ELECTION OF MUG-
ABE AS AFRICAN UNION CHAIR 
On January 30, 2015, African leaders ap-
pointed Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe 
as the African Union's (AU) next Chair. The 
ninety year-old Mugabe took the one "year-long 
rotating chairmanship" succeeding Mauritani-
an President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The 
Union elected Mugabe amidst allegations of hu-
man rights abuses by his regime, and longstand-
ing travel bans and sanctions by the European 
Union and the United States. The post, though 
ceremonial, may implicate the Union's position 
of non-interference vis-a-vis human rights. 
Following the nomination of Mugabe by the 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), which he also chairs until August 2015, 
the Union's senior officials expressed contrasting 
views on approving the appointment. While 
the AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma emphasized the Union's goals 
to be "democracy, good governance and human 
rights;' her deputy Erastus Mwencha enquired: 
"Who am I to say to the people, you have elected 
the wrong leader?" 
In 2007, the Union faced a similar dilemma 
on the candidacy of Sudanese President Omar 
Al-Bashir in connection with the Darfur crisis. 
Instead, the Union elected Ghanaian President 
John Kufuor on the ground that his nation was 
celebrating its golden jubilee of independence. 
In other situations, the Union welcomed 
to the same post Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in 
2009 and Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mbasogo in 2011, despite objections 
from civil society groups. 
Mugabe's election may have human rights 
implications despite the symbolic nature of the 
post. Firstly, the Union may be regressing to 
the "sacrosanct" principles of state sovereignty 
and non-interference; core principles before the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) trans-
formed itself into the AU in 2002. These prin-
ciples were very instrumental during the fight 
for independence from colonialism. With this 
transformation, non-interference was supposed 
to be overridden by emerging values such as 
human rights. 
Secondly, Mugabe's election, about which 
Western and African opinions sharply contrast, 
may intensify the Union's anti-neocolonial rhet-
oric. While there is pessimism as to the value 
Mugabe will add, there is also deep respect and 
support for him among many African leaders. 
In one-way or another, his election may fur-
ther strengthen the Union's re-emerging princi-
ple of non-interference at the expense of other 
values such as human rights. 
By Bantayehu Demlie Gezahegn, staff writer 
DOMINIC 0NGWEN-ICC TO 
PROSECUTE LRA LEADER 
On Tuesday, January 6, 2015, a man claiming 
to be Dominic Ongwen, one of the Lord's Resis-
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tance Army's (LRA) top commanders, surren-
dered to United States military forces in Central 
African Republic. The following day Ugandan 
authorities confirmed his identity and explained 
that U.S. forces where holding him at a mili-
tary base in Obo. Ongwen's capture gave rise 
to controversy regarding the jurisdiction under 
which he would be prosecuted-the options 
being Uganda's own courts or the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). However, on January 
13, a State Department deputy spokeswoman 
announced, and the Ugandan Army confirmed, 
that Ongwen would be transferred to the Hague 
for prosecution under the ICC, who indicted 
Ongwen in 2005 on seven counts, including 
murder and enslavement. At first Uganda ap-
peared reluctant to release Ongwen to the ICC, 
wishing to prosecute him in the country's own 
courts instead. Uganda could have exercised its 
right to prosecute Ongwen because-despite 
the ICC's jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes-it is a court 
of last resort, meaning "it will not act if a case is 
investigated or prosecuted by a national judi-
cial system, unless the national proceedings are 
not genuine:' Uganda has pardoned thousands 
of LRA fighters under a 2000 Amnesty Law 
and some feared that Ongwen's "status as both 
victim and alleged author of war crimes" could 
have resulted in such a pardon. 
At the ICC, Dominic Ongwen will be pros-
ecuted for his role as a top commander in the 
LRA, where he served under the group's leader 
Joseph Kony. Ongwen is charged with crimes 
against humanity, specifically murder and en-
slavement. According to Article 7(l)(a) ofICC's 
Elements of Crimes, in order to prove murder 
the I CC prosecution will have to show that ( 1) 
Ongwen has "killed one or more persons;' (2) 
that his "conduct was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population;' and ( 3) that he "knew the 
conduct was part of or intended the conduct 
to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population:' To prove that On-
gwen is guilty of enslavement under Article 7(1) 
(c), the prosecution must show that (1) Ongwen 
"exercised any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over one or more per-
sons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or 
bartering such a person or persons, or by impos-
ing on them a similar deprivation of liberty;' as 
well as evidence proving the same components 
(2) and (3) stated above. 
The prosecution may be able to prove the 
last two elements of both murder and enslave-
ment. The LRA is allegedly to blame for the 
mass killings of over 100,000 people, and the 
kidnapping of over 60,000 children. Their acts 
spanned over a period of thirty years, and oc-
curred across five central African countries. The 
LRA was forced out of Uganda almost ten years 
ago for their cruel acts against humanity, such 
as chopping off prisoners' limbs and abducting 
young women for sex slavery. Such information 
suggests that Ongwen's conduct as an LRA com-
mander was "part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population:' 
In order for the ICC to find Ongwen guilty 
of his alleged crimes, the prosecution will need 
to provide proof of specific instances where 
Ongwen murdered and deprived civilians of 
their liberties. A conviction would be, according 
to Human Rights Watch, an opportunity for vic-
tims of the LRA to receive long-awaited justice 
for the grievances they have suffered. 
AL-SHABAB's ATTACK ON GA-
RISSA AND KENYAN RESPONSE 
On April 2, 2015, four armed gunmen at-
tacked the campus of Garissa University College 
in northeastern Kenya. By nightfall, the death 
toll, as reported by the Kenyan government, 
had reached 147 people. The same night, Joseph 
Nkaissery, the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for 
Interior and National Coordination, announced 
that the Kenyan security forces had killed the 
four gunmen involved in the attack. 
Al-Shabab, the Somalia-based fighter Isla-
mist group responsible for the attack on West 
Gate Mall in 2013, claimed responsibility for 
this attack. The group was also responsible for 
"two attacks in Mandera county in late 2014, in 
which a total of 64 people were killed;' as well 
as other smaller attacks. According to the New 
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York Times, "the Shabab has killed hundreds of 
Kenyans-on country buses, in churches, in a 
quarry last year where they marched off miners 
before dawn and also made them lie face down 
in rows:' These attacks have been especially 
prevalent since October 2011, mainly as retalia-
tion for Kenya's military troops entering Somalia 
to fight against al-Shabab. 
Survivors of the attack on Garissa claim that 
the gunmen urged students to step out of their 
dormitories if they wished to survive, claiming 
that the alternative was death. However, the 
gunmen allegedly began shooting students as 
they flooded out, or forced students to lay down 
in rows where they proceeded to execute them 
with gunshots to the head. Some survivors also 
recounted instances where the attackers ordered 
students to call their parents and make it known 
that this attack was in response to "Kenya's 
military intervention in Somalia:' Although it 
appears that most students were killed indis-
criminately, the majority of the victims are said 
to be non-Muslims. 
The condemnation of al-Shabab's acts were 
unanimous-even a group of ethnic Somali men 
"marched down Garissa's main road to show 
solidarity with the victims:' In the wake of the 
attack, there appears to be growing resentment 
of the Kenyan government. Despite the impend-
ing possibility of such attacks, the security at 
Garissa University was minimal, comprised of 
only two guards. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
also argues that "Kenya's efforts to tackle rising 
insecurity have been marred by serious human 
rights violations:" limited freedom of expres-
sion, "extrajudicial killings, enforced disap-
pearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture by 
security forces:' 
Articles 48 through 51 of the Kenyan Con-
stitution ensure that all persons have access to 
justice and that their rights to due process are 
upheld. Articles 6 and 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
of which Kenya is a state party, prohibits the 
arbitrary deprivation of life, and torture, respec-
tively. Although Article 4 of the ICCPR ac-
knowledges a country's need to employ certain 
extreme measures "in time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation;' it clearly 
states that there should never be any derogation 
from Articles 6 and 7, among others. 
Deputy Africa Director of HRW, Leslie Lef-
kow, understands the "shock and anger" caused 
by the Garissa attack. However, he argues that 
"law enforcement operations that respect Ken-
yan and international law are essential" to pre-
serving basic human rights, especially those of 
the Muslim and ethnic Somali persons against 
whom Kenyan police and soldiers are discrim-
inating. Further, given Garissa's proximity to 
Somalia, the Kenyan government was aware of 
the city's and university's "vulnerability to [al]-
Shabab attacks;' yet it "failed to appropriately 
address" this weakness. ''Amnesty International 
emphasizes the Kenyan government's responsi-
bility to guarantee the human rights of all its cit-
izens within the boundaries of the Constitution 
and the law;' which includes safe educational 
institutions for its students and teachers. 
By Stefania Butoi Varga, staff writer 
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AHEAD 
OF BURUNDI'S 2015 ELECTIONS 
On April 15, 2015, the United Nations (UN) 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid 
Ra'ad Al Hussein, referred to Burundi's 2015 
general elections as a "critical moment" in the 
nation's history with a chance for the country to 
choose "the path of free and fair elections which 
would strengthen and mature Burundi's still 
fragile democracy, and enable an improvement 
in its dire socio-economic situation:' However, 
since then, violent demonstrations have claimed 
the lives of at least twenty-seven people. The 
fighting erupted after the country's ruling party, 
the National Council for the Defense of De-
mocracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy 
(CNDD-FDD), nominated President Pierre 
Nkurunziza on April 26, 2015, as its presidential 
candidate for a third term, a move that some 
Burundians say violates the country's constitu-
tion and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement. Supporters, however, argue that 
Nkurunziza's candidacy violates neither law be-
4
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol22/iss1/4
cause the parliament elected Nkurunziza to his 
first term, not the people. Discontent surround-
ing the election has continued to mount. 
On May 14, 2015, violence continued after 
an attempted coup organized by a group of 
military officers failed. Although officials ar-
rested several officers purportedly involved in 
the coup, the whereabouts of the group's lead-
er, Godefroid Niyombara, remain unknown. 
Following the coup attempt, public protests 
resumed on May 18 in Bujumbura despite the 
government's threat of arresting demonstrators 
as "accomplices" to the attempted overthrow. Al-
though the government stated in a press release 
that it would not take revenge, its actions seem 
to demonstrate otherwise. According to a report 
by the UN, hundreds of people remain detained 
in extremely overcrowded conditions "with 
detainees having to sleep standing up:' The UN 
Refugee Agency estimates that over 100,000 Bu-
rundians have fled the country as a result of the 
pre-election violence, seeking refuge across the 
borders of Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. 
The violence has prompted international 
concerns over the Burundian government's pro-
tection of fundamental human rights including 
freedom of expression and the right to peaceful 
assembly, rights guaranteed under Articles 19 
and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Articles 19 and 21 of the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Since 
the onset of demonstrations, there has been a 
"communications clampdown'' in the country, 
with the government blocking social media 
platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Viber, and 
Whatsapp, as well as independent radio stations. 
Adama Dieng, the UN Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide, noted, "the absence of 
independent voices through non-State media 
was contributing to tensions:' During his recent 
visit to the country, the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights stressed that "criticism is a vi-
tal element of democracy, not a threat that must 
be crushed. The right to freedom of expression 
and opinion is enshrined in international trea-
ties ratified by Burundi, and the Government is 
obliged to uphold those treaties:' 
Furthermore, the alleged use oflive ammu-
nition by government security forces during 
protests prompted the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to urge au-
thorities to fully comply with the UN Basic Prin-
ciples on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials. The principles call upon 
security officials to employ nonviolent means 
before resorting to any use of force, and to only 
employ force when appropriate in proportion to 
the seriousness of the offense, or when strictly 
unavoidable to protect life. The African Union's 
Peace and Security Council has also adopted a 
resolution condemning "any attempt to seize 
power by force" and stressing "the imperative for 
all Burundian stakeholders to settle their differ-
ences through peaceful means:' In addition, the 
European Union has suspended $2.3 million aid 
to Burundi unless "conditions for a free, peace-
ful and credible election are secured:' 
In response to the violence, UN Secre-
tary-General Ban Ki-moon has urged Burun-
di's government "to uphold the human rights 
of all Burundians, including the freedoms of 
assembly, association and expression, and to 
take concrete steps to prevent political killings 
and violence:' In a separate statement, the UN 
Security Council recalled its "intent to respond" 
to violent acts that undermine peace and se-
curity in the country. The United States has 
advised President Nkurunziza to renounce his 
candidacy. John Kirby, a spokesperson for the 
U.S. Department of State echoed this sentiment 
by stating, "President Nkurunziza's decision to 
disregard the term limit provision of the Aru-
sha Accords has destabilized Burundi and the 
sub-region, triggered violence, and endangered 
Burundi's economic well-being:' 
Although the coup attempt ultimately 
failed, Burundi's future stability remains un-
clear, sparking rumors of another civil war in a 
country with a longstanding history of political 
unrest. Despite the opposition parties' demand 
to President Nkurunziza to renounce his third-
term bid, whether he will continue to run in the 
election remains tentative. 
By Andrea Flynn-Schneider, 
Social Media Editor 
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